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RESEARCH
We determined factors associated with occupational 
transmission in Wisconsin during the 2003 outbreak of 
prairie dog–associated monkeypox virus infections. Our in-
vestigation included active contact surveillance, exposure-
related interviews, and a veterinary facility cohort study. We 
identiﬁ  ed 19 conﬁ  rmed, 5 probable, and 3 suspected cases. 
Rash, headache, sweats, and fever were reported by >80% 
of patients. Occupationally transmitted infections occurred 
in 12 veterinary staff, 2 pet store employees, and 2 animal 
distributors. The following were associated with illness: 
working directly with animal care (p = 0.002), being involved 
in prairie dog examination, caring for an animal within 6 feet 
of an ill prairie dog (p = 0.03), feeding an ill prairie dog (p = 
0.002), and using an antihistamine (p = 0.04). Having never 
handled an ill prairie dog (p = 0.004) was protective. Veteri-
nary staff used personal protective equipment sporadically. 
Our ﬁ  ndings underscore the importance of standard veteri-
nary infection-control guidelines.
D
uring May–June 2003, an outbreak of monkeypox vi-
rus (MPXV) infections, initially detected in Wiscon-
sin, occurred in the midwestern United States (1,2). These 
MPXV infections were the ﬁ  rst to be reported outside of 
Africa and involved a West African viral strain (1,3). Afri-
can rodents imported from Ghana were implicated in virus 
introduction in the United States (2,4–7). The African ro-
dents had been transported and housed with native prairie 
dogs that were subsequently distributed as household pets 
in Wisconsin (1). Veterinary and pet store staff are at risk 
for potentially serious occupationally related infections (8–
18). Early links between MPXV infections and prairie dog 
exposures in veterinary facilities and pet stores (1) led us to 
investigate occupationally related exposures.
We conducted an outbreak investigation and a veteri-
nary staff cohort study to quantify and characterize all cases 
that occurred during the 2003 Wisconsin MPXV outbreak, 
identify protective and risk factors for occupationally trans-
mitted infections, and determine veterinary work practices 
amenable to infection-control guidelines. Because both 
investigations were urgent outbreak control measures, no 
institutional review board approval or written consent was 
required or obtained.
Methods
Outbreak Investigation
The Wisconsin outbreak case deﬁ  nition (online Appen-
dix, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/8/1150-
app.htm) was similar to case deﬁ  nitions established by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for hu-
man MPXV infection (19). Cases were classiﬁ  ed as con-
ﬁ  rmed, probable, or suspected according to clinical, epi-
demiologic, and laboratory criteria. Case ﬁ  nding was done 
through electronic postings (email and website postings), 
faxes, and mass media. Active surveillance of persons in 
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contact with infected persons or animals included self-re-
corded diaries of signs and symptoms for 21 days postexpo-
sure or daily telephone assessments by local health depart-
ment personnel. Data were summarized at the Wisconsin 
Division of Public Health (WDPH).
Willing pet store employees were given a standardized 
questionnaire to assess prairie dog contact and were offered 
serologic testing. Affected animal distributors were inter-
viewed about work roles and animal care.
Veterinary Staff Cohort Study
The eligible cohort was deﬁ  ned as all persons, regard-
less of work roles, employed at any Wisconsin veterinary 
facility where at least 1 outbreak-associated prairie dog 
was treated during May 13–27, 2003. Cohort members 
were deﬁ  ned as those facility employees who participated 
in the study. Cohort case-patients were deﬁ  ned as cohort 
members who had laboratory-conﬁ  rmed MPXV infections, 
regardless of the presence or absence of speciﬁ  c signs or 
symptoms. Tissue conﬁ  rmation required demonstration of 
MPXV by viral culture, PCR, immunohistochemistry, or 
electron microscopy. Although cases could not be serologi-
cally conﬁ  rmed by outbreak case deﬁ  nition criteria, cohort 
members with MPXV infections conﬁ  rmed by tissue or 
serologic testing were deﬁ  ned as cohort case-patients. Se-
rologic conﬁ  rmation required the ﬁ  nding of elevated ortho-
pox immunoglobulin M (IgM) titers in a specimen obtained 
within 56 days after rash onset or seroconversion in paired 
acute- and convalescent-phase specimens. The cohort study 
had no probable or suspected-case deﬁ  nitions and, hence, 
no probable or suspected cases.
Signs and symptoms surveyed were rash, fever, chills, 
sweats, headache, joint pain, or lymphadenopathy within 
21 days of most recent exposure to an ill prairie dog. Co-
hort members with a history of vaccinia vaccination or un-
known vaccination status and birth date before 1972 were 
deﬁ  ned as vaccinia-vaccinated.
A standardized questionnaire was used to determine 
exposure to prairie dogs, general work practices, demo-
graphic information, and medical history. Questions to as-
sess contact with prairie dogs during the reception, initial 
examination, ongoing medical care, and discharge of the 
prairie dogs had possible answers of yes, no, unknown, or 
not applicable. Cohort members who did not work within 48 
hours after the prairie dog’s veterinary visit were excluded 
from the exposures analysis but included in the remainder 
of analyses. Questions about general work practices such 
as sanitizing, hand hygiene (handwashing or cleaning with 
alcohol gel), and animal bedding changing practices had 
possible answers of yes, no, unknown, or not applicable; or 
they used Likert-scale responses of always, usually, some-
times, rarely, never, or not applicable.
WDPH or local health department personnel admin-
istered the conﬁ  dential questionnaire in person or by tele-
phone. Data were entered into Microsoft Ofﬁ  ce Access 2003 
(Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA, USA) and analyzed us-
ing Epi Info version 3.3 (CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA). Likert-
scale responses of always and usually were dichotomized 
from sometimes, rarely, and never. Responses of unknown 
or not applicable were excluded.
Willing participants provided acute- and convalescent-
phase serum specimens, which were tested for nonspeciﬁ  c 
orthopox virus IgM and IgG levels at the CDC poxvirus 
laboratory (20). Tissue testing was conducted as part of pa-
tients’ clinical care.
Outbreak-associated prairie dogs treated in Wisconsin 
veterinary facilities were traced backward and forward. In-
formation was obtained about their illnesses and treatments.
Results
Outbreak Investigation
WDPH received 104 reports of potential human MPXV 
infections. Of these, 27 represented case-deﬁ  ned illnesses: 
19 (70%) conﬁ  rmed, 5 (19%) probable, and 3 (11%) sus-
pected. Illness onsets occurred during May 15–June 13, 
2003 (Figure 1). Based on date of ﬁ  rst exposure, the me-
dian incubation period was 12 days (range 1–41 days). Me-
dian age of case-patients was 28 years (range 3–48 years), 
and 18 (67%) were female. Patients resided in 5 Wisconsin 
counties: Milwaukee (n = 14), Waukesha (n = 8), Clark         
(n = 3), Jefferson (n = 1), and Washington (n = 1). Among 
conﬁ   rmed case-patients, those positive by test method 
were distributed as follows: PCR, 15 (79%); immunohisto-
chemistry, 12 (63%); virus culture, 9 (47%); and electron 
microscopy, 4 (21%).
Signs and symptoms reported by >80% of case-patients 
were rash, headache, sweats, and fever. Those reported by 
60%–70% of case-patients were chills, sore throat, cough, 
or lymphadenopathy. All other signs and symptoms were 
reported by <23% of case-patients. No statistically signiﬁ  -
cant differences in signs and symptoms were reported be-
tween conﬁ  rmed and probable or suspected case-patients. 
Five (19%) patients were hospitalized; none died.
In terms of exposure settings, 12 (44%) cases, includ-
ing 10 conﬁ  rmed, occurred in staff of veterinary facilities 
where ill prairie dogs had received care (Figure 2). Other 
cases occurred in 6 members of households with prairie 
dogs, 4 pet store visitors, 2 pet store employees, 2 animal 
distributors, and 1 visitor to a household with prairie dogs. 
No known cases occurred in healthcare workers who treated 
patients or in laboratory workers who handled specimens.
Symptom diaries were completed by 258 persons, in-
cluding 28 pet store employees and 7 veterinary staff. Lo-RESEARCH
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cal health department personnel monitored 243 other per-
sons by telephone, including 77 veterinary staff. Among 
501 persons followed up, 10 (2%) experienced illness; all 
10 were veterinary staff.
Two pet stores had received outbreak-associated prai-
rie dogs. Of 28 employees (26 from store A, 2 from store 
B), 19 (68%) completed the questionnaire: 11 had handled 
prairie dogs, 9 had fed prairie dogs, 2 had been bitten by 
a prairie dog, and 2 had been scratched by a prairie dog. 
One store A employee had a conﬁ  rmed case, and 1 store B 
employee had a suspected case; both had handled ill prairie 
dogs. The store A employee had a tissue diagnosis of MPXV 
conﬁ  rmed by viral culture and PCR and was positive for or-
thopox IgM and IgG antibodies in acute- and convalescent-
phase serum specimens. The store B employee had prior 
vaccinia vaccination; a convalescent-phase serum speci-
men was negative for orthopox IgM and positive for IgG. 
Approximately 2 months after the last prairie dog exposure, 
serum specimens were obtained from 12 noncase pet store 
employees, 4 of whom had handled ill prairie dogs. All 12 
had negative orthopox IgM antibody results.
Two Wisconsin exotic animal distributors (distributors 
2 and 3, a married couple) distributed outbreak-associated 
prairie dogs and housed animals in their home. Distribu-
tor 2 had a conﬁ  rmed case of MPXV infection, distribu-
tor 3 had a suspected case, and an immunocompromised 
household member who had no direct animal contact had a 
conﬁ  rmed case.
Veterinary Staff Cohort Study
Four veterinary facilities had treated 3 outbreak-as-
sociated prairie dogs. These facilities employed 81 (range 
3–59) persons during the outbreak; 74 (91%) participated 
in the cohort study (cohort members), and 44 (54%) partici-
pated in the serosurvey. Table 1 summarizes demographic 
characteristics of cohort members, serosurvey participants, 
and cohort case-patients. At least 1 veterinarian from each 
facility was a cohort case-patient. Among 17 cohort case-
patients, 8 (47%) had tissue and serologically conﬁ  rmed 
cases, 7 (41%) had serologic conﬁ   rmation only, and 2 
(12%) had tissue conﬁ  rmation only. The 17 cohort case-
patients included all 10 veterinary staff with conﬁ  rmed 
cases and 2 with probable or suspected cases (previously 
mentioned in the overall outbreak investigation). Five se-
rologically conﬁ  rmed cohort case-patients did not meet the 
deﬁ  nition of an overall outbreak case-patient.
Fever, sweats, chills, rash, lymphadenopathy, and 
headache were each associated (p<0.001) with conﬁ  rmed 
MPXV infection (Table 2). Among cohort case-patients, 15 
(88%) had multiple signs and symptoms and 2 (12%) had 
only 1 sign or symptom (headache and a nonvesicular, non-
pustular rash of unknown onset date, respectively). Severe 
keratitis required corneal transplantation for 1 cohort case-
patient, and a miscarriage occurred at 12 weeks of gesta-
tion. Two cohort case-patients did not experience a rash.
By using the number of cohort members from each 
facility as the denominator, we calculated veterinary fa-
cility attack rates as follows: facility 1, 25%; facility 2, 
67%; facility 3, 7%; and facility 4, 25%. The attack rate 
among cohort members for all 4 facilities combined was 
23%. All cohort case-patients had been in the veterinary 
facility within 48 hours of the prairie dog’s visit. The only 
factor protective against MPXV infection (Table 2) was 
never having handled an ill prairie dog (p = 0.004). Hav-
ing a job involving direct animal care (e.g., veterinarian, 
veterinary technician, or veterinary assistant) was associ-
ated with having a conﬁ  rmed case (p = 0.002). Four types 
of exposures were associated with having a conﬁ  rmed 
case: participating in an initial (p = 0.004) or follow-up 
(p = 0.04) examination of an ill prairie dog, caring for an 
animal within 6 feet of the ill prairie dog (p = 0.03), and 
feeding the ill prairie dog (p = 0.002). Vaccinia vaccina-
tion status did not differ between those who performed at 
least 1 of these 4 high-risk activities and those who did not 
(p = 0.9). All cohort case-patients reported having practiced 
hand hygiene after examining or feeding the ill prairie dog. 
Figure 1. Reported dates of illness onset for persons with monkeypox virus infection. Data from the outbreak investigation and the 
veterinary facility cohort study, by exposure classiﬁ  cation and case status, Wisconsin, 2003. One veterinary cohort case-patient is not 
included in this ﬁ  gure because of unknown date of illness onset. P, pet store employee or visitor; H, household contact; V, veterinary facility 
staff; D, animal distributor. Occupational Risks, Monkeypox
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Gloves had been used by cohort case-patients during the 
following activities: 2 (40%) initial examination, 3 (60%) 
follow-up examination, and 3 (75%) feeding an ill prairie 
dog. No cohort case-patients reported having used surgi-
cal masks, goggles, or face shields during these high-risk 
activities. Four cohort case-patients had fed a prairie dog 
on 8 occasions: placed food in the cage without touching 
the prairie dog (1×), hand fed prairie dog by syringe (3×), 
placed food directly in the prairie dog’s mouth (3×), or fed 
through gastric tube (1×). Although having spent >30 min-
utes handling the prairie dog approached signiﬁ  cance (p = 
0.09), 7 (41%) cohort case-patients reported never having 
handled a prairie dog. All of these 7 cases resulting from in-
direct exposure occurred in employees of facility 4. Five of 
these 7 case-patients reported having been within 3 feet of 
prairie dog C, 1 reported having been in the same room as 
prairie dog C but not within 3 feet, and 1 reported not being 
in facility 4 while prairie dog C was there but being there 
within 48 hours of its death. Multivariate analysis was not 
possible because of the small number of cohort members 
with each type of exposure.
Using antihistamines during the prairie dog visit 
(p = 0.04) was associated with being a cohort case-patient 
(Table 2). Antihistamine use was considered a possible 
surrogate for hand-to-face contact because users of antihis-
tamines generally have allergies or rhinorrhea and likely 
touch their eyes or nose frequently. No other personal med-
ical history was associated with illness. Previous vaccinia 
vaccination (p = 0.95) was not protective against MPXV 
infection. Few cohort members reported immunosuppres-
sive medication use (n = 3), immunosuppressive illness 
(n = 2), or being pregnant (n = 2).
No general work practice was a protective or risk fac-
tor for being a cohort case-patient. General work practices 
were not outbreak speciﬁ  c and were used to assess overall 
risk for communicable disease transmission. Several cohort 
members reported hand-to-mouth activities (eating, drink-
ing, chewing gum, or applying lip products) in animal care 
areas (Table 3). Only 12% who cleaned ill animals’ cages 
reported having used gloves during this task. Most (92%–
93%) cohort members reported cleaning their hands before 
eating at work and after ill animal contact.
The 44 serosurvey participants included 9 of 10 pa-
tients with tissue-conﬁ  rmed cases and 35 of 64 persons 
without tissue-conﬁ  rmed cases (p = 0.04). Cohort members 
with direct animal care jobs were not more likely (p = 0.19) 
than those without such jobs to have participated in the se-
rosurvey. MPXV infection was serologically conﬁ  rmed for 
13 (65%) persons who provided paired serum specimens 
and 2 (10%) who provided only acute-phase serum speci-
mens. No evidence of asymptomatic seroconversion was 
found. Among serosurvey participants, only feeding a prai-
rie dog was statistically associated (p = 0.02) with having a 
conﬁ  rmed case of illness, and no personal medical history 
factors were associated with illness. A history of vaccinia 
vaccination was not protective against MPXV infection 
(p = 0.35). Nineteen (43%) serosurvey participants had 
been vaccinated. Of these, 6 (32%) had MPXV infection; 5 
had multiple signs or symptoms; and 1 had only a nonpus-
tular, nonvesicular rash. Four (67%) of the vaccinia-vac-
cinated serosurvey participants with conﬁ  rmed cases had 
serologic conﬁ  rmation only (no tissue conﬁ  rmation was 
attempted), and 1 (17%) had both tissue and serologic con-
ﬁ  rmation of illness. Two serosurvey participants (A and 
B) with conﬁ  rmed cases and previous vaccinia vaccination 
had no acute elevation of IgM. Participant A had symptom-
atic illness conﬁ  rmed by IgG seroconversion and multiple 
high-risk exposures, including participation in 2 prairie dog 
examinations and having provided care to an animal within 
Figure 2. Cases of human monkeypox virus infection. Data from 
the outbreak investigation and veterinary facility cohort study, by 
exposure setting and case status, Wisconsin, 2003. A, exposure to 
prairie dog A; B, exposure to prairie dog B; C, exposure to prairie 
dog C. Exposure = direct contact or same-room exposure. *Prairie 
dog sold at swap meet. NE, northeastern; WI, Wisconsin; SE, 
southeastern; solid arrows, prairie dog sale and exposure; dashed 
arrows, prairie dog exposure only.RESEARCH
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6 feet of the prairie dog. Participant A’s IgM levels were 
not elevated at 15, 36, and 50 days after exposure. Partici-
pant B had symptomatic, pathologically conﬁ  rmed illness 
and multiple high-risk exposures, including participation in 
4 prairie dog examinations, having fed the prairie dog, and 
having provided care to an animal within 6 feet of the prai-
rie dog. Participant B’s IgM results were not elevated, and 
IgG results were positive without a boost in titer at 16 and 
157 days after exposure. Participant B had a history of bone 
marrow ablation and an allogenic bone marrow transplant.
An Illinois animal distributor (distributor 1) obtained 
prairie dogs from a Texas distributor (C. Austin, pers. 
comm.). During April–May, 2003, distributor 1 housed ≈200 
prairie dogs with African rodents that had been purchased on 
April 21 and subsequently implicated in MPXV introduction 
(2,6,7). Distributor 2 purchased 39 prairie dogs, including 
prairie dogs A, B, and C, from distributor 1 and transported 
them to Wisconsin during April 15–May 17 (1,4). Prairie 
dog A remained in the custody of distributor 2 until it was 
taken to facility 1 (Figure 2) for 10 minutes for carbon diox-
ide chamber euthanasia on May 13, 2003. Prairie dog B was 
sold at a swap meet on May 11; became ill with conjunctivi-
tis, lymphadenopathy, and papular skin lesions on May 13; 
was examined at facility 2 for 10–30 minutes on May 15; 
and died on May 20. Prairie dog C was sold to pet store A on 
May 5 and sold to a customer on May 17. On May 19, prairie 
dog C had illness onset with conjunctivitis, skin lesions, and 
respiratory disease. Prairie dog C was examined in facility 3 
for 20–25 minutes on May 22 and hospitalized at facility 4 
from May 25 until its death on May 27. Facility 4 staff pro-
vided extensive treatment including repeated examinations; 
hand feeding; eye discharge removal; and oral, subcutane-
ous and nebulized treatments. Sixteen (59%) outbreak cases 
and 14 (82%) veterinary cohort cases were associated with 
prairie dog C.
Discussion
The 2003 outbreak of MPXV infections affected Wis-
consin residents who had been exposed in multiple set-
tings; however, 59% of cases occurred among occupation-
ally exposed persons. Our cohort study demonstrates that 
veterinary staff were particularly at risk (23% attack rate). 
Pet store employees were at lower risk (7% attack rate). 
Infected prairie dogs were probably more ill and shedding 
more virus while in veterinary facilities than in pet stores, 
which would account for more observed infections among 
veterinary staff. Both Wisconsin distributors of ill prairie 
dogs became ill. The preponderance of occupationally ac-
quired cases was unique to Wisconsin during this outbreak. 
Among other involved states, 1 veterinarian from Indiana 
had a suspected case, and cases occurred in 2 employees of 
distributor 1 (7,21,22).
Most outbreak cases (59%) and veterinary cohort cases 
(82%) were associated with exposure to prairie dog C. We 
found no intrinsic differences in the monkeypox infection 
of prairie dog C compared with that of prairie dogs A or B 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of veterinary facility cohort members during outbreak of monkeypox virus infections, Wisconsin,
2003
Demographic variable* 
All cohort members
(n = 74), no. (%) 
Serosurvey participants only  
(n = 44), no. (%) 
Cohort case-patients only  
(n = 17), no. (%) 
Sex 
  Female  56 (76)  34 (77)  13 (76) 
  Male  18 (24)  10 (23)  4 (24) 
Race
  White  73 (99)  44 (100)  17 (100) 
  Unknown  1 (1)  0 0
Ethnicity 
  Not Hispanic  67 (90)  40 (91)  16 (94) 
  Hispanic  6 (8)  4 (9)  1 (6) 
  Unknown  1 (1)  0 0
Job title 
  Veterinarian  12 (23)  9 (20)  6 (35) 
  Veterinary technician  18 (24)  14 (32)  6 (35) 
  Veterinary assistant  18 (24)  11 (25)  5 (29) 
  Receptionist  14 (19)  6 (14)  0)
  Clinic manager  4 (5)  4 (9)  0
  Other†  3 (4)  0 0
No. employees  
  Facility 1 (n = 4)  4 (5)  3 (7)   1 (6) 
  Facility 2 (n = 3)  3 (4)  3 (7)  2 (12) 
  Facility 3 (n = 15)  14 (19)  5 (11)   1 (6) 
  Facility 4 (n = 59)  53 (72)  33 (75)  13 (76) 
*Ages, median (range), y: all cohort members, 31 (17–57); serosurvey participants, 31 (20–57); cohort case-patients, 31 (23–47).
†Custodial and information services staff.  Occupational Risks, Monkeypox
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and no explanation for this association, although length and 
type of exposures in facility 4 were likely accountable. Fa-
cility 4 had many more employees than the other facilities, 
and prairie dog C was hospitalized there for a relatively 
prolonged period (3 days) and received extensive treat-
ments there. In addition, the fact that 7 (54%) facility 4 
cohort case-patients reported never having handled prairie 
dog C indicates that other transmission modes (e.g., fomi-
tes, aerosols) could have contributed to that facility’s large 
number of  cases. Nebulization treatments, which prairie 
dog C received ≈4× at facility 4, could have exposed em-
ployees to MPXV. Although nebulization was performed 
in an enclosed plastic chamber, the nature of the treatment 
would foster aerosolization, coughing, and possibly mo-
bilization of respiratory secretions with which employees 
could have unknowingly come into contact.
Although our Wisconsin investigation showed no 
deﬁ   nitive evidence of human-to-human transmission of 
MPXV, which concurs with other states’ ﬁ  ndings during 
this multistate outbreak (6,7,21,23), such transmission re-
mains a possibility. Because persons who had had no direct 
contact with ill animals became ill with MPXV infection, 
person-to-person transmission within veterinary facilities 
might have occurred. However, because of the lack of per-
sonal protective equipment use among the cohort members 
and the ﬁ  nding of MPXV in ill prairie dog’s urine and feces 
Table 2. Medical data for veterinary facility cohort members during outbreak of monkeypox virus infections, by case status, Wisconsin,
2003*
Patient data 
Cohort
case-patients,
no./total† (%) 
Cohort members 
without confirmed 
case, no./total† (%)  p value‡  RR 95% CI 
Signs and symptoms 
  Rash  15/17 (88)  3/57 (5)  <0.001 23.3 5.9–92.4
  Fever  12/16 (75)  5/57 (9)  <0.001 9.9 3.7–26.7
 Chills  14/17  (82)  4/57  (7)  <0.001 14.5 4.7–44.9
 Sweats  14/17  (82)  8/57  (14)  <0.001 11.0 3.5–34.6
  Headache  13/17 (76)  7/57 (12)  <0.001 8.8 3.2– 23.8 
  Joint pain  6/17 (35)  7/56 (13)  0.06 2.5 1.1–5.6
 Lymphadenopathy  11/16  (69)  2/57  (4)  <0.001 10.2 4.3–24.3
Exposures to ill prairie dogs 
  Was in clinic within 48 h after prairie dog visit  17/17 (100)  50/57 (88)  0.19 UND NA
  Admitted prairie dog to facility  1/17 (6)  6/44 (14)  0.66 0.5 0.1–3.1
  Involved in initial evaluation of prairie dog  5/16 (31)  1/44 (2)  0.004 4.1 2.2–7.7
  Cared for animal within 6 feet of prairie dog  9/12 (75)  12/31 (39)  0.03§ 3.1 1.0–10.0
  Gave oral antimicrobial drugs   3/12 (25)  4/40 (10)  0.33 2.1 0.8–6.0
  Gave subcutaneous fluids  4/12 (33)  5/41 (12)  0.18 2.4 0.9–6.4
  Gave subcutaneous antimicrobial drugs 1/11 (9)  3/41 (7)  1.00 1.2 0.2–7.2
  Gave nebulized therapy  3/12 (25)  4/41 (10)  0.18 2.2 0.8–6.2
  Involved in follow-up examination  5/12 (42)  5/41 (12)  0.04 3.1 1.2–7.7
  Took radiographs of prairie dog  1/11 (9)  1/41 (2)  0.38 2.5 0.6–11.1
  Fed prairie dog  4/12 (33)  0/41 (0)  0.002 6.1 3.3–11.6
  Cleaned cage of prairie dog  12/12 (100)  36/43 (84)  0.32 UND NA
  Cleaned discharge from prairie dog's eyes  6/15 (40)  7/41 (17)  0.09 2.2 1.0–5.0
  Examined any animal on surface used to 
  examine prairie dog within past 24 h 
7/11 (64)  9/30 (30)  0.07 2.7 1.0–7.9
  Spent >30 min handling prairie dog  4/17 (24)  4/53 (8)  0.09 2.4 1.0–5.6
  Never handled prairie dog  7/17 (41)  43/53 (81)  0.004 0.28 0.1–0.6
  Spent >30 min within 3 feet of prairie dog  7/17 (41)  14/53 (26)  0.25§ 1.6 0.7–3.7
  Job involved direct animal care  17/17 (100)  36/57 (63)  0.002 UND NA
Medical history 
  Vaccinia vaccination   7/17 (41)  23/57 (40)  0.95§ 1.0 0.4–2.4
  Atopic dermatitis  1/17 (6)  4/57 (7)  1.0 0.9 0.1–5.2
  Seasonal allergies  7/17 (41)  21/57 (37)  0.75§ 1.2 0.5–2.7
  Open sores at time of prairie dog visit  5/17 (29)  9/57 (16)  0.28 1.8 0.8–4.3
  Upper respiratory infection at time of prairie 
 dog  visit 
3/17 (18)  3/57 (5)  0.13 2.4 1.0–6.1
  Antihistamine use at time of prairie dog visit  4/17 (24)  3/57 (5)  0.04 3.0 1.3–6.6
*RR, relative risk; CI, confidence interval; UND, undeterminable; NA, not accurate. 
†Denominators vary according to total no. persons with work roles appropriate to the exposure; e.g., a receptionist would not be expected to administer 
subcutaneous fluids. 
‡Fisher exact 2-tail test unless otherwise indicated. 
§Mantel-Haenszel test. (21), environmental exposure may well account for these 
cases.
The substantial amount of illness among veterinary staff 
underscores the importance of infection-control practices in 
veterinary settings. Cohort case-patients frequently did not 
use personal protective equipment during high-risk activi-
ties (e.g., examining or feeding ill prairie dogs). Further-
more, cohort members reported general work practices that 
foster hand-to-mouth activities in animal care areas. Few 
(12%) cohort members reported having used gloves when 
cleaning ill animals’ cages, a task that can contaminate staff 
hands with animal dander, urine, and fecal matter. We can-
not determine whether infection-control guidelines would 
have prevented MPXV infections among veterinary staff, 
but use of personal protective equipment might have limited 
viral transmission. The National Association of State Public 
Health Veterinarians recently released the Veterinary Stan-
dard Precautions Compendium (24), the ﬁ  rst guidelines to 
describe standard infection-control practices for veterinary 
facilities. Use of these guidelines should be encouraged.
In contrast with results from a previously published 
study (25), results of our cohort study do not support the 
conclusion that prior vaccinia vaccination protected against 
MPXV infection in this outbreak. Hammarlund et al. found 
that 3 (37%) of 8 vaccinia-vaccinated persons in this out-
break had asymptomatic MPXV infections and surmised 
that they had long-term immunity against MPXV infection 
(25). Our cohort study showed that previous vaccinia vac-
cination did not protect against MPXV infection; all pre-
viously vaccinated serosurvey participants with positive 
serologic results had at least 1 sign or symptom of MPXV 
infection. The more systematic inclusion and analysis of 
exposed persons within our cohort, compared with the co-
hort-series approach of Hammarlund et al., may account 
for the difference in this ﬁ  nding (26). 
Our case deﬁ  nition for the cohort study differed from 
that of the overall outbreak investigation. Among veteri-
nary staff, the 2 deﬁ  nitions resulted in different case num-
bers: the outbreak case deﬁ  nition resulted in 10 conﬁ  rmed 
and 2 probable or suspected cases; the cohort study case 
deﬁ  nition resulted in 17 conﬁ  rmed cases. Serologic results 
were not a conﬁ  rming criterion in the outbreak case deﬁ  -
nition because their results were not validated at the time 
and because serologic specimens were not systematically 
gathered throughout the multistate outbreak.
For unknown reasons, 2 cohort case-patients had no el-
evation of orthopox IgM. Although the IgM response might 
have been missed, this is unlikely given the timing of speci-
men collections. Also, previous vaccinia vaccination might 
have altered the immune response to the MPXV infection. 
It is also possible that participant B’s past medical history 
might have affected the immune response to this infection.
Our study has several potential limitations. Although 
91% of employees at the 4 affected veterinary facilities 
participated in the cohort study, only 54% participated in 
the serosurvey. Persons with tissue-conﬁ  rmed illness were 
more likely than persons without such illness to have par-
ticipated in the serosurvey. These factors might have re-
sulted in an underestimation of overall cases and limited 
the detection of asymptomatic seroconversion. Recall bias, 
which might have overestimated the association between 
prairie dog contact and illness, was likely limited by rela-
tively brief intervals between exposures and data collection. 
Finally, statistical analysis beyond univariate analysis was 
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Table 3. General work practices of 74 veterinary facility cohort members during outbreak of monkeypox virus infections, Wisconsin,
2003*
Work practice  No. (%) 
Sanitizes examination table  44 (81) 
Sanitizes examination room countertops  32 (59) 
Eats in work break room  59 (82) 
Eats where animals are treated or housed  1 (1) 
Drinks where animals are treated or housed  10 (14) 
Chews gum where animals are treated or housed  11 (15) 
Applies lip products where animals are treated or housed  6 (8) 
When cleaning cages, agitates bedding enough to aerosolize material in cage  5 (10) 
Wears gloves when cleaning ill animals' cages  6 (12) 
Does animal laundry at work  31 (58) 
Cleans hands after contact with ill animals  65 (93) 
Cleans hands before eating at work  67 (92) 
Cleans hands when leaves work  57 (77) 
Changes out of work shoes before leaving work  8 (11) 
Changes out of work clothes before leaving work  7 (11) 
Washes work clothes at home  70 (95) 
Washes laboratory coat at home  14 (50) 
Washes work clothes between work shifts  67 (93) 
Washes laboratory coat between work shifts  15 (50) 
*The denominators vary according to the number of cohort members who perform a given task.  Occupational Risks, Monkeypox
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limited because of the small number of cohort members 
involved in each of the high-risk prairie dog exposures.
Our investigation and cohort study demonstrate that 
occupational exposure, especially among veterinary staff, 
was a critical factor during this outbreak. This outbreak 
highlights the importance of standard infection-control 
guidelines developed for veterinary settings and the need 
to encourage their use.
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